Technical Due Diligence for Acquirers
TL;DR
Most technical due diligence misses the risks that actually matter — the ones that live in the code, the deployment topology, and the on-call rotation. We find them because we have shipped production software, and because we have been the target of acquisition diligence ourselves.
The Problem
You are about to spend millions — or tens of millions — acquiring a company. The financials look solid. The product demo was impressive. The market thesis checks out. But you do not know what is actually inside the codebase. You do not know whether the architecture will survive your scale. You do not know whether the engineering team can function without the founder who built the first commit.
The standard diligence report — the one produced by a generalist consultancy — will tell you that the target uses "industry-standard technology" and has "adequate security controls." It will not tell you that the auth system has no token rotation, the database has no migration strategy, the CI pipeline takes four hours, and the two engineers who understand the payment module both have competing offers.
Those are the findings that turn a successful acquisition into a write-down. They are also the findings that only an engineering team can surface — because they require reading code, tracing architecture, and talking to engineers as peers, not as interview subjects.
Why This Is Hard
Codebases do not come with warning labels. The architectural decisions that will limit your growth were not documented as decisions — they were made incrementally, under deadline pressure, by engineers who have since left. Finding them requires forensic skill: tracing data flows through multiple services, identifying coupling points that look harmless at current scale, and recognizing when a design pattern is a deliberate choice versus an accident of history.
Security assessments are particularly treacherous. A penetration test finds vulnerabilities that exist today. It does not find the systemic gaps — no secrets rotation, no dependency scanning, no incident response plan — that guarantee vulnerabilities tomorrow. You need an assessment that evaluates the security posture, not just the security surface.
And then there is the team. A codebase can be repaired; a broken engineering culture cannot. Assessing team health — bus factor, knowledge distribution, engineering practices, cultural alignment with your organization — requires conversations that go deeper than a standard reference check. It requires engineers talking to engineers, about engineering.
How Mihok Fieldworks Approaches It
We read the source. We do not delegate code review to a tool or a checklist. We clone the repositories, trace the critical paths, and assess the codebase the way we would assess our own — line by line where it matters, structurally where the risk is architectural. We identify the modules that are well-factored and the ones that will need a rewrite within eighteen months.
We evaluate infrastructure as a system, not a list. A deployment topology, an observability stack, a CI/CD pipeline, a secrets management strategy — each is individually simple to describe. The diligence value is in understanding how they interact: whether the alerting covers the failure modes the architecture creates, whether the deployment process is fast enough to support the incident response SLOs, whether the access-control model survives the acquisition.
We interview the engineers who built the system — not as subjects of a questionnaire, but as peers we might one day work alongside. We ask the questions that get past the prepared answers: What is the part of the system you are least proud of? What would you rewrite if you had six months and no feature pressure? Who else on the team could do your job if you left tomorrow?
We have been on both sides of this table. We have built systems that were acquired. We know what diligence looks like from the target side — what questions are asked, what answers are prepared, what gets conveniently omitted. That experience makes us harder to fool.
The person who scopes the problem is the person who writes the code and stays until it’s running. No junior bench. No handoffs.
Proof
Our team has first-hand acquisition experience: we were the first engineering hires at companies that were successfully acquired. We built the systems that passed diligence — and we saw, from the inside, what the acquirer's engineering team actually cared about versus what their procurement checklist asked for. That gap is where acquisition risk lives.
We have assessed targets across sectors — fintech infrastructure, healthcare platforms, developer tools, AI/ML startups — for acquirers ranging from growth-stage companies making their first acquisition to established platforms absorbing a competitor's technology. In every engagement, we have surfaced risks that the standard diligence process would have missed:
- An auth system with no token revocation — discovered by tracing the session lifecycle through three microservices, not by reading the architecture doc
- A database migration strategy that worked at 10k rows but would take the system offline at 10M — discovered by running the migrations against a production-sized dataset
- A key-person dependency where one engineer held all institutional knowledge of the payments module — discovered in a 45-minute technical interview, not a 10-question survey
- An AI model whose "proprietary training data" turned out to be a lightly-filtered public dataset — discovered by comparing data distributions against known public corpora
